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Despite ample literature on the topic of populism itself, much less has been 
written on the specific relationship between populism and human rights. First, I discuss 
the relationship between populist ideology and human rights in theory. I argue that 
populism is inconsistent with human rights accounts because of its rejection of pluralism 
and vilification of the ‘other.’ Second, I explore the relationship between populism as a 
political strategy and its impact on human rights under two Latin American regimes. I 
argue that despite its tendency to produce short-term gains in economic and social 
development, a review of the two cases supports the claim that populism by its very 
nature tends to be adversarial towards basic civil and political human rights. This enmity 
is amplified when the populist regime exhausts the resources for generous social 
programs. Furthermore, the combination of a populist regime with a real security threat is 
found to be a particularly dire situation for human rights.
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 “Everything you conceive, everything you contemplate, will be good, 
great, elevated, sublime, if it accords with the general and common 
interest. There is no quality essential to your species apart from that which 
you demand from all your fellow men to ensure your happiness and theirs. 
…do not ever lose sight of it, or else you will find that your 
comprehension of the notions of goodness, justice, humanity and virtue 
grow dim.” 
-Diderot, Encyclopedié 1 
Like many of the concepts in political philosophy and political science, the 
concept of populism can be identified with an apparent paradox. On the one hand, as the 
above quote by Diderot demonstrates, our understanding of democracy and legitimate 
political order is substantially based on the rule of the people, or popular sovereignty. On 
the other hand, our liberal conception of proper political order is based on the rule of law, 
which is specifically designed to prevent any one “people” from ruling indefinitely. 
Taken together, the seemingly contradictory logics of popular sovereignty and the rule of 
law constitute our contemporary understanding of constitutional democracy (Canonvan 
2002; Abts and Rummens 2007). This seems paradoxical.  
 The two-strand model of constitutional, deliberative democracy holds that these 
two opposing ideas could, in practice, devolve into their own, independent logics. That is 
to say, a regime could exist that was based solely on the rule of law, and one could exist 
that was based solely on the idea of popular sovereignty (populism). Both regimes would, 
in a sense, be perversions of the kind of democracy that we have endorsed and 
implemented the world-over. But the logic of populism is at least partially contained 
within the logic of constitutional democracy, and so one can flow from the other.   
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 It is for this reason that many authors have sought to defend manifestations of 
political populism as loud reminders that sovereignty does indeed rest with the people 
(Arditi 2003, 2007). Some, for example, have argued that populism arises in those states 
where sovereignty has been consolidated in the hands of a few elites. In these cases, it is 
argued, populist uprisings are healthy, good signs that the people are demanding a return 
of their sovereignty and a move towards democratic governance (Arditi 2003). Recent 
events in Egypt, Libya and other Middle Eastern states seem to lend credence to this 
view. This has led some authors to conclude that populism is a kind of redemptive force, 
a restoration of the true promise of democracy (Canovan 1999, 2002; Taggart 2000, 
2004), or even the most pure form of democracy (Tännsjö 1992).  
 The purpose of this paper is to take issue with these favorable conceptions of 
populism, and to argue that the populist regime-type threatens certain core human rights. 
I divide my discussion of populism and its relationship into two parts. In the first part, I 
explore the theoretical content of populism. I argue that a fully populist political theory is 
antithetical to individual human rights for two reasons. First, I show that populism is 
based upon an explicit rejection of pluralism, a social quality that forms the basis for our 
justification for human rights. Second, I argue that populism’s central belief in a 
homogenous popular body is inherently exclusionary. This exclusionary quality of 
populism, I argue, leads to a de-legitimization of political discussion and opposition, 
which in turn threatens certain well-established human rights.  The conclusion of the first 
portion of this paper is that populism is theoretically inconsistent with and ultimately 
adversarial towards liberal conceptions of human rights. Despite some positive 
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characterizations of populism found in the literature, I argue that human rights advocates 
should be especially concerned when populist regimes take power.  
 In the second part of my paper, I begin to explore the concept of populism 
empirically. As the first portion would suggest, populism has indeed been correlated with 
human rights abuse, especially in states where existing democratic institutions are weak 
or newly-established. The populist regimes of Latin America, arguably the region of the 
world in which populism has been most strongly embraced, exemplify this tendency. 
Nonetheless, the regime of Hugo Chavez in Venezuela appears to be a marked exception 
to this rule. Despite thirteen years of the clear and self-proclaimed populism of the 
Chavez regime, Venezuela remains largely democratic, and human rights have not been 
abused to the degree that they were in other populist regimes.  
In light of this peculiarity, I compare the Chavez regime with the neighboring 
regime of Alberto Fujimori in Peru. The populist regime of Fujimori followed a much 
more typical course, where the promises of popular sovereignty were rapidly replaced 
with a brutal form of authoritarianism. I provide an account of human rights abuses in 
both cases, with an emphasis on the populist strategy itself. Next, I argue that the 
variance between these two cases helps to illustrate two important independent variables 
that, I argue, have a substantial impact on the propensity for populism to lead to human 
rights abuse in general. First, I demonstrate that the oil-based Venezuelan economy 
combined with opportunistic nationalization polices have allowed the Chavez regime to 
finance generous social programs over the long-term, something that Fujimori lacked the 
capacity to do. Under Fujimori’s regime, as the ability of the government to finance 
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generous social programs declined, abuses of civil and political rights sharply rose. Thus, 
I argue that the ability to finance generous, targeted social programs is negatively 
correlated with human rights abuse. Second, I show that Chavez was much less 
successful than Fujimori in using ‘threats to the people’ as a justification for increased 
authoritarianism. In Peru, a real threat to internal security helped Fujimori maintain high 
approval ratings as he consolidated power and collapsed civil and political rights. In 
Venezuela, Chavez has been unable to unite the people behind any of the threats which 
he has identified, and therefore his march towards authoritarianism has been repeatedly 
and successfully challenged. Thus, I argue that the presence of a security threat of high 
salience is particularly dangerous for human rights when a populist regime is in power.  
 The identification of a relationship between these two variables and the abuse of 
human rights within populist regimes is a starting point for further research into the 
matter. If populism as a theory of politics is at odds with our liberal conception of human 
rights, then we have reason to engage in more in-depth and thorough research into how 
this adversarial relationship manifests itself in the real world. The comparison of the 
populist regimes of Fujimori and Chavez is a first-step in this direction, and it suggests at 
least two variables that have an impact.  
Part One- Populism and Human Rights in Theory  
 In the following section, I will first defend a conceptualization of populism in 
which “the people” are treated as a homogenous unity that must be fully sovereign. The 
logic of this populist viewpoint has two central characteristics that threaten civil and 
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political rights. First, it explicitly rejects a pluralist conception of society, where 
heterogeneous groups with diverging and converging interests and values exist in a 
common political space. This pluralist conception of society is what gives birth to the 
need for inviolable private space, and the need for civil and political rights to ensure that 
no one group, including the state, is allowed to stamp-out or dominate another. Second, I 
argue that within the populist logic, the interests of the mythical homogenous society are 
deemed expressions of the general will, or specifications of what is good for everyone 
within the state. Those interests or viewpoints that do not accord with the general will are 
thus de-legitimized, and political discussion, engagement and debate are derided. This, I 
argue, puts opponents of the majority viewpoint at serious risk of persecution. These two 
characteristics of populism cast into serious doubt the claims of some authors that 
populism can function as a healthy rejuvenation of the democratic ideal.  Instead, the 
coming to power of a populist regime puts civil and political rights at risk. 
I- Defining Populism within Political Thought 
The proper definition of populism has been a subject of much debate and 
disagreement. Since the prospects for formulating a consensus definition do not currently 
look very promising, it is necessary for each author discussing populism to describe in 
detail what specifically they are talking about.  First, in much of the existing 
philosophical literature, the concept of populism tends to be equated with direct 
procedural or majoritarian democracy. William Riker’s (1982) famous book on the 
shortcomings of majoritarian democracy, Liberalism Against Populism, is one such 
instance of this practice. Dahl (1989 pp.154) takes the same approach in Democracy and 
6 
 
Its Critics, equating populism with majoritarian democracy. It should be noted that these 
conceptions of populism are distinct from the one I’m discussing in this paper. As Joshua 
Cohen (1986, pp. 28) has argued, even philosophy’s most famous populist, Rousseau, 
was not committed to purely majoritarian democracy. Instead, I support the view of those 
authors who have understood populism not as something procedural but rather as 
something ideological (Canovan 1981, 1999, 2002; Taggart 2000; Laclau 1979; Abts and 
Rummens, 2007; Mény and Surel 2002; Mudde 2004).  
In the second section of this paper, I will discuss various empirically-based 
definitions of populism. These definitions, as they have evolved over time, track the 
varied ways in which populism has manifested itself in the real world. But we are more 
concerned in this section with populism’s position within political philosophy. The 
discussion of populism’s empirical definition should help us identify a populist 
government when we see it, whereas this discussion should help us recognize a populist 
idea when we see it.  
Two key concepts form the heart of the populist ideology: first, the ‘the people’ and 
second, ‘sovereignty.’ Populism maintains distinct interpretations of these two concepts 
which distinguish it from other forms of political ideology like liberalism, Marxism or 
fascism. First, as has already been mentioned, populism conceives of the people as a 
unified, homogenous body. This mythical interpretation of society holds that such a body 
has a common will and a single interest. Individual interests are subsumed into the whole 
of the common interest. Rousseau described the condition of individual interests within 
this homogenous body with his famous line, advocating “the total alienation of each 
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associate, together with all his rights, to the whole community” (Rousseau 2001 [1762] 
§I.6, pp. 776). So individuals within the populist ideology are fully incorporated, entirely 
subsumed within the popular body. ‘The people,’ within populism are not some 
collection or assortment of individuals; instead, ‘The People’ are one, unified thing.  
From this conception of ‘the people’ follows the populist conception of sovereignty. 
Sovereignty of the people means the direct expression of the people’s will in the activities 
of the state. The liberal, constitutional understanding of representative democracy is 
rejected by the populist logic. It is not enough for the popular will to be represented, there 
instead needs to be true embodiment of the will in the state (Schmitt 1928). Leaders must 
not merely represent the people, they must be the people, they must be an actual 
embodiment of the general will. In other words, within populism there is an identity 
between rulers and subjects. As such, sovereignty of the people means direct rule of the 
popular will. This leads us to a definition of the populist ideology that was mentioned 
above: sovereignty must rest solely with the popular whole. 
II- Populism and Human Rights 
At first glance, populism might seem to be a positive force for human rights. When 
faced with totalitarian, repressive regimes, demands for a return of sovereignty to the 
people can be considered positive developments. Furthermore, if populists maintain that 
the common or general will should determine state activity, this rules-out any form of 
oligarchy in which narrow, minority interests dominate and subvert the wishes of the vast 
majority (Canovan 2002). Benjamin Arditi (2003, 2007) has argued that the crude 
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pragmatism of modern constitutional democracy needs to be occasionally disrupted by 
populist movements, as a way of reminding institutions that they are instruments of the 
popular will. 
Conceiving of the people as a unified, sovereign whole might have some symbolic 
use for grounding democratic practice away from elites and back to the average person, 
but this function is akin to ingesting a little bit of poison to improve overall immunity. 
There are at least two significant ways in which populism is inconsistent with civil and 
political human rights, and for this reason we should be wary of populism, particularly in 
those places where liberal institutions are weak or newly-established. In these developing 
countries, with ill-established protections for human rights, populism presents at least two 
distinct challenges to human rights. 
III – Populism versus Pluralism 
First, populism rejects a pluralist conception of society in favor of the homogenous 
conception described above. This is relevant to human rights because it obviates the need 
for a distinct, inviolable private sphere marked-off by negative rights.2 If there is a 
substantive identity among citizens in the populist version of society, including an 
identity between rulers and citizens, then rights against one another are simply 
unnecessary and extraneous (Schmitt 1928, pp. 233-238). If the populist state is truly an 
expression of the general will, then, following the populist logic, in a very real sense the 
state is the individual. To require protections from this state would be not only 
nonsensical, it would be unjust.  
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In the homogenous conception of society, real freedom is found in the free will of the 
collective; an individual can be free only insofar as her will coincides with the will of the 
collective (Rousseau 2001 [1762] §I.6).  Negative rights, therefore, are unjust restrictions 
of freedom because they restrict the activities of the collective body. So the distinction 
between public (collective) and private (individual) essentially disappears according to 
the populist conception of society, because there is a substantive identity between the 
two. Accepting this identity makes it very difficult, if not impossible, to defend any 
account of negative rights.   
Conversely, according to the pluralist understanding of society, interpretations of the 
common good are multiple and diverse. It is a central purpose of human rights law and 
practice to ensure that these differing interpretations are given equal consideration in the 
public realm (Dworkin 2002, pp. 1-7). According to the logic of constitutional 
democracy, the plurality of these interpretations requires processes of political 
participation and deliberation, ultimately leading to interpretations of the common good 
that are both temporary and contingent (Habermas 1996). The common good or the 
general will is never considered to be a closed matter. Instead, alternative interpretations 
are given legitimate consideration by virtue of a deliberative political process that occurs 
both publicly and in everyday discourse. Even constitutional protections, derided by 
populism as undemocratic, are subject to debate and are can be amended by processes 
that are open to society. 
An account of negative, civil and political human rights is defended as a way to 
ensure this equal consideration of various viewpoints. According to this argument, civil 
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and political rights protect the processes of public deliberation and political participation 
that follow from a recognition of social pluralism. Furthermore, civil and political rights 
protect individuals from the tyranny of one interpretation of the will, a goal which would 
not make sense in the populist logic. If the popular will is given and stable, as it is 
conceived to be within populism, then political decisions simply reflect that will and need 
not be contingent, subject to challenge or subverted by constitutional guarantees. The 
common good receives a final interpretation according to populism, and political 
intuitions should reflect and embody this interpretation. Therefore, within the populist 
logic, rights are understood as unjust constraints on the sovereign whole. If civil and 
political rights exist to protect the processes of deliberation and to protect the individual 
from a final interpretation of the common good, then populism’s dismissal of deliberation 
and incorporation of the individual into the popular whole obviates the need for such 
rights.  
IV – Populism and the Other 
The above section is designed to explain the ways in which the populist conception of 
society removes a central justification for an account of negative human rights, the 
recognition of social pluralism. In this section, I argue that the populist logic also 
specifically threatens and targets civil and political rights. Carl Schmitt (1988 [1923] pp. 
9) has noted that the inclusion of what is homogenous also implies the exclusion or 
destruction of what is heterogeneous. The conception of the people as a unified whole is 
inherently exclusionary, leading to a closed conception of the popular will and a 
delegitimization of dissent and opposition. Those individuals or groups outside of the 
11 
 
homogenous body are thus labeled as enemies of the people, and their civil and political 
rights are directly threatened.  
The liberal, constitutional conception of democracy protects a horizontal structure of 
political antagonisms, where different social groupings and different concentrations of 
interest are opposed to each other on an equal playing field (Habermas 1996). 
Antagonisms can be worked-out with opposing parties on equal political footing, and 
each side, though they may disagree, recognizes the right of the other to express their 
conception of what is right for society. As such, within the liberal paradigm there is 
acceptance and recognition of the legitimacy of minority viewpoints that might be in 
contrast with majority views. 
In contrast, the populist logic maintains a vertical structure of antagonisms (Abts and 
Rummens 2007, pp. 417-419; Cuperus 2003). According to this structure, the 
homogenous people make up the only legitimate locus of political power, and they are 
antagonized either upwards, towards society’s elites, or downwards, towards society’s 
‘degenerates.’  ‘Above’ the people is the unjustly empowered intellectual and economic 
elite, and ‘below’ the people are immigrants, deviants, degenerates, and other groups 
which may be construed as the dregs of society. For left-wing variants of populism, 
antagonisms are directed upwards, towards the elites, and the goal is to restore 
sovereignty to the people. For right-wing variants, antagonisms are often directed 
towards the bottom of society, with the hope of restoring some mythical vision of a 
purified homogenous people (Taggart 2000). In either case, however, the inclusion of 
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certain groups within the homogenous people implies the exclusion and vilification of the 
‘other’ (Canovan 1999).  
The consequence, therefore, of the populist vertical structure is the vilification and 
political delegitimization of opposing or minority viewpoints. Rather than compete with 
political adversaries within a horizontal structure that equalizes participants, the populist 
logic places opponents of the general will either above or below the only source of 
legitimacy, the popular whole. Political opponents are thus cast as enemies of the people 
which should either be destroyed or consumed within the homogeneity of the popular 
will. The populist regime identifies itself with the people as a whole, and as an 
embodiment of the will its activities should not be constrained or opposed. Opposition is 
thus illegitimate and unjust. The next step, quite clearly, is to ensure that such opposition 
is prohibited, in direct violation of civil and political rights.  
This troubling outcome is a direct consequence of the populist belief that sovereignty 
should rest with popular will. As was mentioned above, some authors have argued that 
populism encourages a rejuvenation of democracy or redemption of political power with 
the people. Instead, the logic of populism seriously threatens basic civil and political 
rights by undermining their basis in pluralism and by vilifying the ‘other.’ Populism is 
not an ideology which bolsters the commitment of political institutions to ‘the people,’ 
but rather it is an ideology which is on the brink of authoritarianism. 
Part Two- Populism and Human Rights in Practice 
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 While Part One of this paper concerned the relationship between populism and 
human rights in theory, the following explores the relationship between populist 
governments and human rights as it is manifested in the real world. As it were, classical 
populism was in its heyday during the period of the 1940s and 50s when international 
human rights were moving to the global center stage (Cazar and López-Bermúdez 2009). 
As populist regimes took power across Latin America, the world drafted the UN 
Declaration on Human Rights and other international agreements with central human 
rights principles. Nonetheless, as the arguments in the first section would indicate, 
populist regimes often pursued strategies that ignored democratic institutions, limited or 
eliminated political opposition, curtailed media freedom and generally abused basic 
human rights.  This unhappy relationship between populism and human rights continued 
through the resurgence of Latin American populism in the 1980s and persists in the 
contemporary world.  
The unexpected rise of populism in Latin America in the late 20th and early 21st 
centuries has produced a vast array of literature from the social sciences. Much debate 
has been centered on the proper definition and conceptualization of populism and its 
prospects for promoting democratic consolidation, economic growth and general welfare 
(Canovan 1981, Weyland 2001). Much less has been written on the specific relationship 
between populist governments and human rights. Part of the reason for this fact is the 
contested conceptual status of populism itself. Many authors have vigorously debated 
what populism is and is not, and each definitional quibble has further reduced the 
prospects for a cumulative and thorough exploration of the topic. Nonetheless, in recent 
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years scholars have formed a general, though certainly not universally accepted, 
understanding that populism is an inherently political phenomenon. This newfound 
general consensus on the proper conceptualization of the term has produced an 
opportunity to begin to explore populism in greater detail, with confidence that we know 
what we are talking about.  
 Many works on populism from the social sciences have avoided definitional 
questions altogether, leaving them for other researchers. This has been detrimental for the 
accumulation of knowledge about populism in general because many works simply talk 
past each other. I will adopt the definition of populism that considers it to be primarily 
political; that is, conceptually independent of economic, social or cultural domains. More 
specifically, this section concerns populism as a political strategy, or a method by which 
certain leaders choose to gain and maintain power. Employing this understanding of 
populism, I analyze the two cases of Alberto Fujimori in Peru and Hugo Chavez in 
Venezuela. The purpose of my research strategy is two-fold. First, I analyze the ways in 
which the populist strategy led to human rights abuse in the two cases. As we might 
expect from the above discussion, both Fujimori and Chavez identified their strongest 
sources of domestic opposition and took steps to silence them, an explicit rejection of 
democratic deliberation and a violation of internationally recognized civil and political 
rights. Second, I analyze an important different between the two cases. While both 
regimes abused human rights, the Chavez regime has done so to a much lesser degree 
than other populist regimes in the developing world. A comparison of the Chavez regime 
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with the more typical Fujimori regime helps to illustrate two factors which may mollify 
the impact of the populist strategy on human rights. 
 First, I argue that in Fujimori’s Peru and Chavez’s Venezuela, the regimes 
provided an initial boost to the economic and social human conditions of the most 
disadvantaged and excluded members of society. Since populist leaders rely heavily on 
mass-support, they seek to deliver material incentives to the area where the masses are 
located, which in Latin America typically means working or poor classes (Dornbusch and 
Edwards 1991). Social programs designed for this purpose were successful in improving 
the status of economic and social conditions for the worst-off, but these benefits were 
contingent on the ability of the state to finance them. As the Fujimori regime’s ability to 
finance generous social programs decreased, its tendency to abuse certain civil and 
political rights increased. The opposite was true in Chavez’s Venezuela. This suggests a 
generalizable statement; namely, that as the ability to finance generous social programs 
decreases, the tendency for populist regimes to abuse human rights increases.  
 Second, a close examination of the two cases reveals another important factor in 
the populist political strategy and its relationship with human rights outcomes. Both 
Chavez and Fujimori emphasized the central importance of countering ‘threats to the 
people.’ The salience of the threat in Peru was much greater, and that led to a much more 
brutal form of human rights abuse. The salience of the threat in Venezuela was much 
less, and as such Chavez’s populism has been more benign than his Peruvian counterpart. 
For Fujimori, the real threat of an internal insurgency was used to justify widespread 
abuses of human rights and his rapid march towards authoritarianism. In Venezuela, 
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Chavez initially emphasized a more dubious threat, one which stemmed from global 
capitalism and the imperialism of the United States. The low salience of this threat 
fostered a less-dangerous environment for human rights. Importantly, it was not until a 
coup attempt in 2004 that Chavez more systematically undermined and abused human 
rights. The salience of threats to the regime was found to have an impact on human rights 
outcomes in these two cases. As such, I make the general argument that a populist regime 
combined with a threat of high salience creates a potentially disastrous environment for 
human rights. 
The comparative case study builds upon the theoretical work in the first section 
by allowing us to make additional generalizable statements that can be tested against new 
cases in the future. For example, South African leader Jacob Zuma was elected on a 
populist platform as the chief executive in 2009. Will Zuma follow down the path of 
Fujimori and other populists who have shown the ability to abuse human rights, or will he 
follow the path of Hugo Chavez? Jacob Zuma’s presidency could be an interesting test of 
the external validity of the findings presented in this paper.  
I - Defining Populism in the Empirical Literature 
 The phenomenon that observers labeled ‘populism’ was born between the 1930s 
and 1950s in Latin America. Scholars initially saw populism as a sort of political 
ideology that was born directly from certain socioeconomic conditions (Dix 1985). Kurt 
Weyland (2001, pp. 4) shows that most scholars observing this period developed a 
multidomain conceptualization of populism. That is to say, authors tended to view 
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populism as a concept which covered the domains of economics, politics, society, 
ideology and even personality. The reason for this multidomain conceptualization came 
from the remarkably similar conditions under which populist governments were born and 
the similar political ideologies to which they adhered in the 1930s-1950s. 
Weyland, however, argues that a new conceptual definition of populism should 
remove most of the old associations and place populism firmly and exclusively within the 
domain of politics (Weyland 2001, pp. 11). This conception is superior to the 
multidomain understanding because it helps to distinguish between populism and simple 
totalitarianism. Populists maintain the homogenous will should dominate political power, 
but it does not follow that the will should dominate all of the other realms of society. 
Totalitarians seek to dominate all realms; whether it be the realm of economics, religion, 
family life, community life, the totalitarian seeks control in all areas. But populism makes 
claims only in the realm of political power. The political ideology of populism which was 
described in Part One above emphasizes that only the people’s will can justify state 
activity, and, importantly, state policies or institutions that do not conform to the people’s 
will are unjust. One consequence of this definition is that it can accommodate both left- 
and right-wing varieties of populism in a relatively straightforward way. If the popular 
will supports the interests of the majority, then it follows that the state should correct 
inequities that benefit certain minorities at the expense of the popular majority. For left 
wing populists, the minorities benefiting at the expense of the majority are the 
economically wealthy class, or the social elite. For right-wing varieties of populism, 
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oftentimes newly-arrived immigrant classes, or the welfare-receiving poor, are accused of 
benefiting at the expense of the majority.  
II -A Brief History of Populism 
The political nature of populism was not overlooked by its early observers from 
the 1930s. Populist leaders from of this time were personalistic and charismatic; they 
appealed via direct contact to a large, unorganized mass of followers (Weyland 1999, 
2001; Dix 1985; Edwards 2010). Furthermore, populists in Latin America seemed 
inexorably linked to a heterogeneous and urban social base which was multi-class and 
constituted a broad majority (Weyland 2001).  These political characteristics were seen to 
be inextricable from certain social and economic characteristics, but future developments 
cast this inextricability into doubt.  
 Many researchers argued that populism was most likely to arise during a 
particular stage of economic development. For example, modernization theorists argued 
that populism occurred in societies which had only recently "modernized" (Costa Pinto 
1973). Growth in urban populations, education and industry produced an explosion of 
mass participation.  This exponential growth in participation meant that durable 
institutions were not allowed to gradually evolve, and existing institutions were 
constructed in opposition to the newly enfranchised masses. As such, the new urban 
populations tended to oppose the existing institutional arrangement. The situation, 
therefore, was ripe for an upward-directed form of social antagonism of the kind 
described in Part One above.  
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 As such, populist leaders of this period tended to form alliances with both 
organized and disorganized labor. Their appeal to labor was seen as a consequence of the 
newly enfranchised urban populations, which had in previous decades been agricultural 
workers and farmers. Their appeal to labor led researchers to conclude that populism was, 
among other things, a leftist ideology. This was corroborated by the fact that populist 
leaders also engaged in import-substitution industrialization, a method of protectionism 
that is far easier to implement in the early stages of industrialization. In order to maintain 
the support of their unorganized and disadvantaged base, populist leaders almost 
universally expanded the role of the state in social life. They adopted expansionist 
economic policies and ideologies typically geared towards widespread redistribution of 
wealth (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). 
However, the unexpected re-emergence of populism in Latin America in the 
1980s and its persistence since then presented the old, multi-domain conceptualization of 
populism with serious challenges. So-called "neopopulism" did not carry all of the old 
economic, social and ideological characteristics of the classical populism of the 1930s 
(Weyland 1999; Edwards 2010 pp. 165-191). Modernization theory, long discredited, 
could not account for this reemergence of populism since most Latin American states 
were far beyond the early stages of industrialization. Furthermore, the emergence of a 
new urban class could not explain populism's draw, since by 1980 most Latin American 
states had long-established urban populations. Perhaps most surprisingly, some of the 
neopopulist governments which have arisen since 1980 have enacted thoroughly 
neoliberal economic policies. These economic policies, based largely on the Washington 
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Consensus, seemed to be incompatible with traditional definitions of populism. First, 
neoliberal policies are not usually supported by the labor class of the economy. Second, 
they are usually accompanied by short-term economic pain and sacrifice in favor of long-
term stability and growth. Rather than emphasize redistributive practices and 
expansionary economic policies, neoliberalism favors balanced budgets, privatization and 
a minimal role for the state in the economy. The scholarly understanding of populism 
needed to change. 
III- Populism and Material Benefits 
One thing that has remained constant throughout the periods of populism that we 
have discussed is the political strategy of vote-buying, or what might be called support 
bribery (Dornbusch and Edwards 1991). Populist regimes justify their policies and 
activities on the grounds that they maintain broad-based mass support. A given political 
policy is justified, they argue, if it accords with the will of the masses. As such, populists 
simply must maintain mass-support in order to retain the label of populist. Perhaps the 
most guaranteed way to maintain support is to provide material benefits to potential and 
existing supporters. In other words, a great way to gain supporters is to simply buy them.  
This is why the strategy of import substitution industrialization (ISI) was the 
favored method of economic arrangement for classical populists. ISI takes products that 
are normally imported from other states and replaces them with domestically-produced 
alternatives. For example, rather than import widgets from the US at a low price, a state 
practicing ISI would manufacture the widgets at home and impose high tariffs on the 
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cheaper US-made version. The upside of ISI is that it immediately creates jobs at home. 
ISI chooses to simply ignore comparative disadvantage, building factories and creating 
jobs that would not be competitive in the global market. The downside, of course, is that 
ISI is unsustainable. Constant state intervention and resources are required to keep the 
system afloat, and once the state inevitably loses the ability to sustain ISI, painful 
economic adjustments inevitably occur. It was for this reason that astronomical inflation 
and economic decline plagued Latin American states where populism had taken root 
(Fernández 1991). 
For populist governments, however, the short-term benefits of ISI were enough to 
guarantee support for the immediate future. Providing industrial jobs to poor peasants 
assured these regimes of broad-based popular support, despite the long-term 
unsustainability of the ISI program. As we have seen, however, ISI has since fallen into 
disrepute while populism has remained a powerful force.  Populists have turned to other 
measures to disseminate material benefits to their broad-based coalition of supporters. 
Neoliberal populists, like Fujimori, used the profits from selling-off state industries to 
private buyers to fund generous social programs. Other modern-day populists like Evo 
Morales and Hugo Chavez have used trade protectionism and private industry 
nationalization to generate funds for massive social programs. No matter what the 
favored economic philosophy or policy is, populist regimes tend to use state funds to 
confer material benefits to their real or potential supporters. A central argument of this 
paper is that, within a populist regime, as state capacity to fund generous social programs 
declines, violations of certain civil and political rights by the regime increase. Populist 
22 
 
regimes use material benefits to garner and maintain mass support. When those benefits 
run out, the regime must turn to other tactics to maintain political support, and oftentimes 
these tactics include silencing and removal of opposition. 
IV- Weak vs. Strong Populism 
 When populism is reduced to a particular type of political strategy, it becomes 
immediately obvious that we can extend its application far beyond Latin America. Jean 
Marie Le Pen, a hyper-nationalist French politician who uses glorified images of the 
French nation to appeal to an unorganized base of discontented Frenchmen fits the 
formula well.  Pim Fortuyn in the Netherlands has been described as populist for trying to 
appeal to a wide, nationalistic majority on an anti-immigration platform (Rydgren 2005, 
pp. 58). Some have labeled Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as populist for 
employing a political strategy that seeks to appeal to a wide majority of Iranians through 
ethnocentric and anti-western rhetoric. In the United States, presidential candidates as 
diverse as John Edwards, Ron Paul and Pat Buchannan have been labeled populist. 
However, these populists seem intrinsically different from Latin American examples like 
Hugo Chavez or Carlos Menem. As such, political scientists might want to distinguish 
between “weak” and “strong” types of populism.  
• Weak populism:  Justifies policies based on the popular will, but supports the use 
of existing democratic institutions for the realization of that will. 
• Strong Populism: Justifies polices based on the popular will, but determines that 
existing democratic institutions are inadequate for the realization of that will. 
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Weak populism covers all of those political movements that justify their beliefs based 
upon the popular will, but they do so within the confines of the existing political system. 
In Latin America, the recent populist regimes of “Lula” de Silva in Brazil and Michelle 
Bachelet in Chile are good examples of this form of populism. Both of these leaders 
appealed to the discontented masses with generous social programs and other policies 
that were meant to reflect the will of the people. Nonetheless, both leaders accepted and 
worked within the institutional structures of their respective states. Most North American 
and European populists would also fit within this broad category of weak populism. This 
form of populism is not associated with human rights abuse, and as such will not be 
considered within the scope of this paper. 
 Strong populism, however, does not accept the legitimacy of institutional barriers 
to the realization of the people’s will. This form of populism leads to a “top-down” 
political strategy; where the executive claims direct access to the will of the people. 
Institutional constraints on the executive are seen as unjust obstacles in the way of the 
people. Strong populism has demonstrated a poor track record with relationship to human 
rights. Thus, the focus of this paper will be on strong populism as it has manifested itself 
in recent decades. Discussions of populism in this paper, except for the brief description 
of weak populism above, refer to the strong form. 
 V- Research Design and Scope 
 The general concern for this project is the relationship between human rights and 
populism. Our dependent variable is human rights – so the goal is to explain how 
24 
 
variations in human rights outcomes might be explained by variations in populism. As 
such, the ideal comparative-case analysis would involve populist states that have different 
human rights outcomes. For this reason, Fujimori’s Peru and Chavez’s Venezuela are 
good candidates for a study of this kind. First, it is important to note that both regimes 
exemplified strong populism. Both argued that the justification for political activity 
should be the will of the people, not the established elites. Both regimes also called for 
radical change in the political system, and both were more than willing to bypass or 
dismantle existing institutions to achieve their goals. Both regimes, in other words, were 
strong Latin American populists.  
Nonetheless, there is some significant variance in human rights outcomes for each 
state. Hugo Chavez has generally abused a fairly narrow set of human rights, and his 
political opposition remains strong and vibrant. He has shown little respect for civil and 
political human rights, but he has been willing to accept democratic outcomes that have 
not been in his regime’s favor. In Fujimori’s Peru, however, widespread, wanton and 
extreme human rights abuse took place promptly and regularly in his regime’s tenure.  
 While both regimes have abused human rights, the situation was much worse 
under Fujimori than it has been under Chavez. In other words, there is a useful variance 
in our dependent variable for these two cases. This variance should help to illuminate my 
central research project, which concerns the details of the relationship between human 
rights and populism.  In the following section, I will provide a brief history of the Chavez 
and Fujimori presidencies, documenting the ways in which each regime violated civil and 
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political rights.  Then, I will offer an elaboration of what appears to be the key 
differences which affected the differing outcomes for human rights in each case. 
VI - Exploring the Cases: Fujimori’s Peru 
Since gaining independence in 1824, Peruvian history has been marked by brief 
periods of democratic rule and protracted military dictatorships (Dietz 1992). The last 
military government ruled from 1968–1980, after which a new constitution was drafted 
and elections were held. The decade of 1980-1990 was tumultuous, but the prospects for 
democratic consolidation appeared to be promising. Henry Dietz (1992 pp. 250), writing 
at the very start of Fujimori’s tenure, argued that an “important shift to procedural 
democracy” had taken place during the 80s. Among the facets of the Peruvian state which 
had only recently appeared were “freely contested elections based on universal suffrage, 
relatively free and unrestricted mass media, and serious attempts to protect civil 
liberties…” (Dietz 1992, pp. 251).  Nonetheless, by 1990 Peru had been through nearly 
three decades of horrible economic performance and widespread poverty. At the start of 
the new decade, mismanagement of the economy had led to an inflation rate of 7,649%. 
Furthermore, Castro-inspired leftist rebels known as Sendero Luminoso, or “Shining 
Path” began a campaign of terrorism and destruction throughout Peru. It was under these 
circumstances that the politically unknown Alberto Fujimori won the 1990 Presidential 
election.  Like Chavez, Fujimori rose out of relative obscurity to win a presidential race 
with a large majority. His opponent, Vargas Llosa, represented everything the Latin 
American populist would reject. He was Caucasian in appearance and wealthy. He was a 
highly respected writer and novelist. He called for neoliberal reforms and strict austerity 
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programs, which were hailed by the United States and the IMF. Fujimori assailed the 
candidacy of Llosa with fiery populist rhetoric, lambasting him as an elite in every 
respect, an insider, and a friend of the West. Just three weeks prior to elections Fujimori 
was hovering around 5%, but by the time it was over he was elected President of Peru 
with 60% of all votes cast. 
 Fujimori’s campaign was typical for that of most strong populists in Latin 
America, including Hugo Chavez. First, he ran on an anti-neoliberal platform, promising 
to rearrange the economic system to provide material benefits to the poor and informal 
sectors of the economy. His campaign was entirely against the status quo; Fujimori 
launched on bitter tirades against the existing party system in Peru, arguing that none of 
the existing parties represent the ‘will of the people.’ He lauded his credentials as an 
outsider with no connections to the existing political system and emphasized his status as 
a self-made man (Ellner 2003, p. 146). In short, he adopted a standard populist political 
strategy. His appeal to the lower classes was well demonstrated in election results. Dietz 
(1992, pp. 251) points out a strong correlation between social class and voting behavior, 
with the lower classes turning out in huge numbers to vote for the outsider who spoke to 
them directly. 
 The opposition APRF, however, won a majority in the legislature. Despite his 
campaign rhetoric, Fujimori immediately instituted a series of neoliberal reforms which 
drastically cut government services, employment and expenditures. He also launched a 
campaign against the Shining Path insurgents. By 1992 Fujimori enjoyed approval ratings 
around 42%, while the legislature retained only 14% approval. Although his neoliberal 
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policies were unpopular, his personal appeal was credited with high approval numbers 
(Rocharbrun 1996, pp 24). Like most strong populists, the president increasingly became 
irritated with the institutional constraints placed upon his behavior by the rule of law and 
the legislature. Complaining that congress was blocking his economic reforms and his 
attempt to defeat the Shining Path, Fujimori (with the support of the military) carried out 
a “self-coup” on April 5, 1992. He dissolved congress, cancelled the constitution and 
purged the judiciary. Furthermore, he arrested members of congress, closed two news 
agencies and took military control over the country’s largest prison. Quite clearly, these 
actions were a serious affront not only to representative democracy, but basic civil and 
political human rights. While this violation of human rights was obvious to the world, 
Fujimori had in fact begun violations basic human rights immediately upon entering 
office. A 1993 report by the OAS Inter-American Commission on Human Rights cites 
375 enforced disappearances and mass summary executions occurring in Chilcahuaycco, 
Chumbibilcas, Iquicha and Santa Barbara less than one year into Fujimori’s tenure. After 
the end of his tenure, all events came to be blamed on Fujimori’s security forces (IACHR 
1993, §D.36-37). 
 Furthermore, Fujimori targeted members of the media and human rights 
organizations, the only other sources of internal opposition. According to the 
aforementioned report, Dr. Augusto Paz, Director of the Office of Legal Affairs of the 
Human Rights Commission of Peru, was seriously injured and lost his forearm in a letter-
bomb attack. That same year, in 1991, a letter-bomb killed Melissa Alfaro, senior editor 
of the newspaper ‘Cambio.’ Thus, almost immediately upon taking office, Fujimori 
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began targeting members of the opposition and human rights groups. He also made public 
statements lambasting international human rights agencies. Nonetheless, the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights published a report in 1993 which explained that 
the Fujimori regime had violated the rights to a fair trial, to due process of law and to 
judicial guarantees; the right to personal liberty, the right to life, political rights, and the 
rights of prisoners (IACHR 1993, §C). 
 Nonetheless, after the dissolution of congress and the suspension of the 
constitution, Fujimori’s approval numbers surged. Peruvian citizens viewed the political 
system as corrupt and ineffective, and they were in a state of fear regarding the Shining 
Path insurgency (Rocharbrun 1996, pp. 24). He called for elections in 1993 for a 
“Constitutional Assembly.” His supporters won a majority in the assembly and they 
drafted a new constitution, which was then approved by popular referendum.  The OAS, 
the United Nations and the Peruvian Truth and Reconciliation Commission of 2000 
questioned the true democratic nature of both the elections and the constitutional 
referendum. Media opposition was silenced and strong political opposition leaders were 
jailed or executed in the years leading up to the auto-coup. Among other things, the new 
constitution allowed Fujimori to run for another presidential term. 
 Fujimori’s privatization campaign, a central part of his neoliberal reforms, had 
provided the state with ample funds to support new social projects and programs. 
Fujimori used the funds from these sales to build up his support among the lower classes 
by, among other things, instituting a mandatory minimum wage. In 1995, two years after 
the new constitution had been ratified and at the height of his popularity, Fujimori called 
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new presidential elections, which he won easily with two thirds of the vote. His 
supporters won a majority in the legislature. Again, however, the ultimate fairness and 
true democratic nature of these elections were questioned by numerous human rights and 
democracy advocates. It’s worth noting, however, that the temporary benefits provided 
by the privatization program did improve the economic conditions of many in Peru’s 
underprivileged population. These benefits were used as a tool by Fujimori to assure his 
strong support among the lower classes. As such, they constituted merely another cog in 
the populist political strategy (Kay 1997). 
 Fujimori’s second term gave indications that his populist strategy was faltering. 
First and foremost, the proceeds from the privatization campaign had begun to dry up, 
and several social programs were curtailed. Furthermore, Peruvians had caught on to the 
nature of Fujimori’s authoritarianism and approval numbers started to drop. The president 
had infiltrated all of the state’s institutions, and his National Intelligence Service, led by 
the powerful Montesino, continued to imprison and execute key political opponents, 
including the head of the Peruvian labor movement. By 2000, over 40 percent of Lima 
residents considered Fujimori to be an authoritarian (Atwood 2001, pp. 167). The 1993 
constitution had created two-term limits for presidents, but the electoral commission, 
which was controlled by Fujimori, ruled that he was not bound by this provision since it 
was enacted while he was in office. Fujimori thus ran again for president in 2000. He 
achieved a narrow victory after a run-off election in which over 20 percent of the votes 
were determined to be “invalid” by the Election Commission. His top minister, 
Montesino, was implicated in a massive fraud scandal which made clear the depth of 
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corruption and abuse that had taken place during Fujimori’s ten years in power (Ellner 
2003, pp. 147). Facing mounting pressure, Fujimori faxed in his resignation during a trip 
to Japan in late 2000. On April 7, 2009, Fujimori was convicted by a three-judge panel in 
a special Peruvian court of numerous human rights violations. He will serve 25 years in 
prison. This marks the first time in history that a former civilian head of government has 
been convicted and sentenced on human rights violations. 
VII- Chavez’s Venezuela 
 Many researchers have argued that populist leaders by their very nature are 
“charismatic.” Perhaps no one justifies this claim more fully than Hugo Chavez. The 
Venezuelan president has a weekly television show that is hugely popular in the country, 
sometimes airing for 6 hours or more. Chavez is the quintessential populist; he speaks 
directly to Venezuela’s poor majority through his television show, newspaper columns 
and frequent public appearances in front of huge rallies. His supporters feel tied to him 
directly, calling themselves chavistas. He ‘is’ the people, perceived as the embodiment of 
the Venezuelan general will. 
Like the classical populists of the mid-20th century, he rejected neoliberal 
principles. Chavez pits the indigenous and poor population, who share his language and 
features, against the private interests in Venezuela and global capitalism. Fujimori often 
cited the dangers and crimes of the “Shining Path” terrorist group as a way to unite his 
supporters around a “common enemy.” In a similar vein, Chavez makes frequent 
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references to the imperialism of the United States and the hidden threat of Jewish, 
“moneyed” interests.3 
 Chavez, after a failed coup attempt in 1992, was elected president of Venezuela in 
1998. Like Fujimori, Chavez was viewed as an outsider, someone who reflected the 
values and status of the common person. He has gone to great lengths to cultivate this 
image. His speeches are often filled with local colloquialisms (Ellner 2004, pp. 123). He 
has referred to himself as a ‘simple man,’ and often as a ‘soldier.’ Also like Fujimori, 
Chavez was an unlikely candidate to win the 1998 elections. After receiving little support 
from the outset, Chavez numbers had risen to 30% by May, 1998. On Election Day in 
December, he won the election with 56% of the vote. Like most populists, Chavez ran on 
a campaign that was anti- status quo; he called for the old political system to be scrapped. 
Upon entering office in 1999, Chavez launched a referendum for the creation of a 
constitutional congress, with 92% of the population agreeing that one should be created. 
Another referendum ratified the new constitution in December of 1999. In less than a 
year, Chavez had completely transformed the Venezuelan political system.  
 The new, 350-article constitution was both hailed and criticized by human rights 
groups (Human Rights Watch 2008). Among other things, it extended presidential terms 
to 6 years, albeit limiting presidents to two terms. Executive power was increased, giving 
the president the ability to disband the legislature in times of emergency. However, it also 
allowed for presidential recall by popular referendum. It also abolished the old bicameral 
legislature in favor of a unicameral with reduced powers. Despite these somewhat 
troubling new measures, the constitution also enshrined and protected a large and 
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unprecedented number of human rights. Among these were the rights to healthcare, 
education, and a clean environment. Also, indigenous rights were both emphasized and 
protected. Thus, the new constitution made special provisions allowing for the protection 
of economic, social and cultural rights. Nonetheless, some observers were concerned 
about the potential for significantly expanded executive power and the curtailment of 
other, equally important rights. 
 New elections were held in 2000 for all members of the newly created 
government, including Chavez. He and his supporters won solid control of the 
government, after which they went about implementing the socialist policies upon which 
they had campaigned. It appeared that Chavez’s populism, although moderately 
authoritarian, was a benign type that actually sought to improve the lives of most 
Venezuelans. But Chavez’s flamboyant behavior, his nationalization campaign, his use of 
media intimidation and his radical economic policies culminated in a 2002 coup attempt. 
In a stunning display of the personal connection Chavez had developed with his 
supporters, thousands of chavistas surrounded the presidential palace and demanded his 
release. The coup lasted only two days and Chavez was returned to power. As Human 
Rights Watch, Amnesty International and the Inter-American Commission on Human 
Rights have noted, civil and political rights have never been the same in Venezuela since 
the coup (Human Rights Watch 2008, §I). 
 Chavez blamed the privately controlled media for the coup, and he set out on a 
campaign to both intimidate and overtly shut-down private media outlets. To this end, he 
has been very successful, with only one main opposition station, only available to those 
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who can afford cable television, remaining.4 Other stations have either stopped criticizing 
Chavez altogether or only do so indirectly. Using newly created laws against “libel,” the 
Chavez government has also arrested and intimidated journalists and international human 
rights observers (HRW 2008, §IV). On the other hand, the Chavez government has 
allowed for the creation of over 300 independent community media outlets throughout 
Venezuela. HRW (2008) reports that this proliferation of local media is among the most 
advanced and developed in the hemisphere. While Chavez has been generally successful 
in silencing the opposition media on a national scale, he has allowed the local stations to 
remain in operation. Additionally, vigorous and vibrant debate continues within 
Venezuela’s highly polarized civil society. Despite Chavez’s attempt to restrict media 
freedom, opposition, protest and debate remain a central part of Venezuelan democracy. 
The curtailment of national media freedoms is a bad sign for human rights; the existence 
of a strong, diverse civil society and developed local media is not.  
 The most serious violation of basic human rights since the 2002 coup has been the 
destruction of the impartiality of Venezuela’s courts. The Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights criticized the impartiality of Venezuela’s courts in 2003, and a 2008 report 
by Human Rights Watch paints a similarly grim picture.  After the Venezuelan Supreme 
Court failed to investigate the suspected instigators of the 2002 coup and subsequently 
authorized a recall referendum in 2004, Chavez took action to limit the independence and 
impartiality of the nation’s Supreme Court. He increased the number of justices from 20 
to 32, altering the composition of the court in favor his supporters. He also weakened 
provisions in the 1999 constitution which were designed to protect the court. According 
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to the new laws, enacted in 2004, the executive had the power to indefinitely ‘suspend’ 
justices. Furthermore, the new laws allow for the legislature to nullify the appointment of 
justices in the Supreme Court, effectively placing the court in a subordinate position to 
the legislature. However, Venezuelan courts have remained generally effective in 
protecting citizens’ human rights and carrying out impartial justice. Thus, the danger for 
human rights comes not from the heretofore actions of the courts, but from the potential 
that they could be abused by the government in the future. (HRW 2008, §V) 
 Although the status of human rights in Venezuela has changed since 2002, the 
situation is better than it has been under previous Latin American populists, with 
Fujimori being a prime example. Additionally, the Chavez government has shown a 
willingness to accept election outcomes which are not in its favor. This is significantly 
evidenced by the 2007 defeat of a constitutional amendment that would have ended 
presidential term limits. Although the referendum was eventually passed by a slim 
majority in 2009, it wasn’t until after Chavez and his supporters engaged in a protracted 
and public battle with the opposition.5 This sort of behavior is characteristic of a 
democracy, albeit not one anyone would label as perfect.  
VIII- Exploring Similarities, Explaining the Differences 
 In Venezuela and Peru, two leaders assumed power according to a particular 
political strategy: populism. In each case, the leaders rose from relative obscurity to 
become the anti-status quo candidates. Both appealed to a discontented majority of 
mostly poor or working class supporters. Furthermore, both sought to legitimate their 
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behaviors on the basis of widespread public approval. They also tried to garner support 
by attempting to create a unified front against an external “threat” to the people (e.g. the 
Shining Path, the U.S.). Neither leader had much use for most of the institutions which 
normally accompany democracy. Instead, they employed a plebiscitarian brand of 
democracy, which treats the popular referendum as the most legitimate democratic 
institution.  
 Both Hugo Chavez and Alberto Fujimori used their populist strategy to expand 
the power of the executive and redefine the political system, which fits with the 
theoretical description of populism in Part One. If the popular will is one thing, than its 
best expression would be one person. To this end, both established new constitutions in 
the early years of their tenure. The growth in executive power and the circumvention of 
democratic institutions creates a climate in which opportunities for the abuse of human 
rights increase to a significant degree.  
 This study shows that, for these two cases, certain human rights were indeed 
violated in both cases. Populism is bad for human rights, especially strong populism as 
we defined above. Populists come to power not based on any particular ideology, 
economic policy or special interest orientation. Their power comes directly from a 
discontented majority that must, for all intents and purposes, remain discontented and 
focused on the executive as the source of their relief. Their discontentment must not be 
directed at the populist leader, but rather upwards, towards society’s elites. But which 
rights did each populist violate in common, and, does this tell us about populism in 
general? 
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 Our analysis of Venezuela and Peru demonstrates two ways in which human 
rights are at risk under populist governments. The first human rights that come under 
assault in populism are the freedoms of expression articulated in Article 19 of the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.  Populists rely heavily upon mass 
support. Since populism is a strategy to maintain mass support, populist leaders have an 
incentive to limit the voice of opposition individuals or groups, a policy that is also 
consistent with the ideology of populism. Both Fujimori and Chavez sought to take 
unitary control of government in order to circumvent institutional opposition that might 
come from the legislature or judiciary. This act alone does not constitute a violation of 
basic human rights. However, the subsequent lack of legitimate or institutional opposition 
places a large responsibility on the independent media. By definition, the populist 
political strategy circumvents regular democratic institutions- which leave the media as 
the most significant remaining source of opposition short of rallies and referendum. Since 
opposition can be crippling to populist governments, and the populist ideology casts 
opposition as illegitimate, the media is clearly among the groups most at risk. 
Accordingly, Chavez and Fujimori limited media freedoms and basic freedoms of 
expression. The expanded libel laws in Venezuela are a prime example.  According to 
this analysis, populism threatens the freedoms of expression. 
 The second way in which both Fujimori and Chavez used populist tactics to 
violate human rights concerns Article 14 of the ICCPR. Article 14 states that every 
individual has a right to a fair and lawful trial before “a competent, independent and 
impartial” court. In both of our cases, the courts were treated as a threat to the populist 
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strategy, and were thus purged or altered in favor of the executive. This works in tandem 
with the definition of populism described in Part One. Institutions like the judiciary are 
an obstacle to populism, which treats the mythical, homogenized society as the only 
source of legitimacy.  Judges are not accountable to the popular will, and thus they may 
take actions that limit the executive or his supporters in expressing it. Specifically, 
Fujimori and Chavez both purged and then stacked the courts in their favor in the early 
years of their tenures. Since populism bypasses or disregards institutions that cannot be 
direct expressions of the popular will, judicial independence is at risk. According to this 
analysis, populism threatens the independence and impartiality of the judiciary.  
 Furthermore, the two main human rights areas affected by the populist strategy 
for power facilitate the potential for additional, more serious human rights abuse by 
weakening or eliminating important institutions that protect these rights. When strong 
populists take power, human rights advocates should be especially concerned with the 
real potential for the abuse of these two core human rights categories, but they should 
also be on alert for more serious violations like those that occurred under Fujimori. Our 
analysis of Venezuela and Peru supports this conclusion. 
IX- Declining Support, Increasing Abuse 
 Both the likelihood and intensity of human rights abuse in Venezuela and Peru 
were affected by the abilities of each executive to buy support with generous social 
programs. Fujimori solidified his support among the lower classes by using the profits of 
state privatization to fund social programs. Since privatization is a one-time source of 
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income, Fujimori cracked-down on his political opposition much earlier than Chavez. As 
the money for his social programs dried-up, Fujimori’s support among the lower classes 
dwindled. His regime finally had to resort to election-rigging to essentially falsify a 
populist mandate.  
In the Chavez case, however, social programs and giveaways to the poor have 
remained a relatively constant hallmark of his presidency. In 2004, for example, Chavez 
spent $1.7 billion in oil revenues to fund educational programs for illiterate adults. As 
such, support for Chavez among the dispossessed classes has remained strong throughout 
his presidency. Venezuela’s oil-based economy provides a constant stream of state 
revenue that is not available in most other states. This has allowed Chavez to maintain 
broad support without having to completely eliminate sources of domestic opposition. A 
clear demonstration of this fact is that disorganized masses of poor people basically shut-
down the 2002 coup attempt. Since then, Chavez has launched even more social 
programs, including the provision of cheap cell-phones among those who couldn’t 
normally afford them. It remains to be seen how the recently weakened Venezuelan 
economy and the potential for austerity measures will affect the Chavez regime.  
X- Threats to the Regime  
In both cases, rights to media, association and judicial independence were 
violated. However, the Fujimori regime went beyond these abuses to engage in 
widespread murder, forced disappearance, election rigging and extortion.  In Fujimori’s 
Peru, the existence of the Shining Path insurgency provided a basis upon which the state 
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could expand its power to coerce citizens and violate their basic civil and political rights. 
Fujimori suspended constitutional guarantees while maintaining widespread support for 
his actions. This support would not have been possible without the national fear that had 
been generated by the insurgency. Fujimori’s personal connection with his supporters 
was the cornerstone of his populist strategy, and it was this trust that permitted the 
draconian measures taken against Sendero Luminoso. 
Conversely, in Venezuela, the increasing authoritarianism of Hugo Chavez has 
been met with resistance. The 2002 coup attempt is viewed by many as a direct response 
to the overconcentration of executive power. The 2004 recall attempt also signaled 
society’s uneasiness and unwillingness to accept the limitations on basic human rights 
which follow from increased authoritarianism, as was the narrow defeat of the 2007 
amendment extending term limits. The persistence of vocal opposition in Venezuela also 
indicates that populism alone does not allow for the abuse of the basic rights to life, 
political participation and the freedom from arbitrary arrest and detention. Absent the 
Shining Path insurgency, Fujimori would likely have faced much greater opposition to 
his authoritarian ways. Chavez’s repeated, very vocal and flamboyant criticisms of the 
United States and “global capitalism” have not been as effective as Fujimori’s appeals to 
the Shining Path, which was actually killing people in the Peruvian Andes. 
XI- Confounding Variable? 
 One other factor which may help to explain the different outcomes for human 
rights in Peru and Venezuela is the behavior of international actors, particularly the 
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United States. From the outset of his presidency, Fujimori enjoyed relatively calm 
relations with the international community. He was hailed by the IMF, World Bank and 
the United States for his neoliberal reforms. Although his self-coup in 1992 was 
condemned worldwide, his assurances to return to democracy quickly satisfied the 
international community. Fujimori also enjoyed good relations with the United States 
because he allowed the DEA to conduct anti-drug trafficking surveillance and raids, 
which led to a real curtailment of the drug exporting from Peru (Ellner 2003, p. 156). 
Fujimori’s cooperation with the United States on these issues lifted much of the pressure 
he might have felt for the widespread abuse of human rights during his term. In 
Venezuela, on the other hand, Chavez’s presidency has always been a point of contention 
for the United States and western international institutions like the IMF. Chavez has 
nationalized American companies, he has engaged in anti-neoliberal economic practices, 
and he has always employed a fiery anti-United States rhetoric. Chavez has opposed the 
US in international bodies like the United Nations, and he has played an activist role in 
OPEC, the world’s oil-cartel upon which the United States is dependent. Furthermore, 
Chavez refused to allow similar DEA surveillance of the drug trade in Venezuela and he 
rejected a US offer to help after widespread flooding in 1999.  
Thus, pressure from the United States and other international actors has been 
constant since Chavez entered power. Essentially, he has been “walking on eggshells” 
since his election in 1999. Each action he takes is intensely scrutinized. His authoritarian 
tendencies have led many in the United States and elsewhere to label him a “dictator” 
long before such a label was warranted. While Fujimori was given much more leeway to 
41 
 
run his country and wantonly abuse human rights, Chavez’s abuses have been met with 
immediate and intense condemnation in the international community. This difference 
undoubtedly plays some kind of a role in explaining the differences in human rights 
outcomes in these two countries. It further illustrates the well-known plea from human 
rights advocates: international attention and pressure does indeed make a difference. 
XII- Conclusions 
 In conclusion, I have argued that populism as a political strategy is adversarial 
towards the rights of expression and judicial independence. When a strong populist takes 
power, rights advocates should be prepared for the possible widespread abuse of these 
two key areas of human rights. Our case comparison supports this suggestion, as both 
Fujimori and Chavez limited these rights as a direct consequence of their populist 
strategy. The case comparison also showed that the widespread abuse of human rights in 
Fujimori’s Peru was possible due to the real existence of a threat from an internal 
insurgency. The combination, therefore, of a populist government and an internal security 
threat could be a potentially disastrous environment for human rights. Furthermore, I 
argued that declining ability to fund social programs for the regime’s supporters led to 
increased authoritarianism in Peru. Conversely, the constant flow of funds to Chavez’s 
supporters has resulted in a more benign regime. Schematically, the relationships I am 
arguing for look like this: 
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1) Populism + threat of high salience = A strong formula for human rights abuse that 
should be of deep concern for human rights activists an international human rights 
institutions.  
2) Populism + threat of low salience = Risk of human rights violations, good chance 
that institutions protecting rights will be weakened. Rights advocates and 
institutions should still closely scrutinize strong populist regimes, but the situation 
is less dire than (1). 
3) Populism + generous social programs = A more stable regime, less likely to take 
drastic measures against human rights. 
4) Populism – generous social programs = A less stable regime, more likely to take 
drastic measures against human rights. 
This formula may help to evaluate other populist regimes or predict the outcomes of 
populist strategies with regards to human rights. Furthermore, this type of formula could 
be used for future research to evaluate emerging populist leaders and the risks involved 
for human rights. For example, Jacob Zuma in South Africa has risen to power on a 
largely populist strategy.6 This research creates a framework with which to evaluate 
human rights risks in future emerging populist regimes. 
Part Three – Final Remarks 
 As I argued in Part One, the populist belief in total popular sovereignty is a 
perversion of one of the two pillars of modern constitutional democracy. With one pillar 
the rule of law and one pillar the rule of the people, the foundations of our democratic 
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system are inherently in tension with one another. As such, in a world of democracies the 
specter of populism will always be lurking in the background. For those leaders who seek 
to employ the populist strategy, the logic of populism is already there, firmly established 
in the consciousness of the democratic mind. Leaders will claim to directly embody the 
will of the people, and they will promise to charge against the elite or those who threaten 
decent society, restoring sovereignty back to the people. 
 In Latin America, those who have made such claims have enjoyed great electoral 
success, but they have shown a strong tendency to abuse civil and political rights in the 
name of the popular mandate. The practice of vote-buying broke Latin American 
economies with the failure of ISI, and Alberto Fujimori demonstrated that even neoliberal 
populists will disregard state balance-sheets in delivering monetary incentives to maintain 
popular support. Furthermore, as these leaders exhaust their ability to fund their populist 
image, they will use the ideology of the popular unity to justify abuse and removal of 
political opposition. Rather than restoring sovereignty to the people, the populist instead 
institutes authoritarianism. Combine this populist belief with a substantive threat to the 
popular body, and a dictatorship without any regard for the lives of those outside the 
homogenous body is bound to take shape.  
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Notes 
1 Diderot, Denis. [1755] 1992. Diderot: Political writings: Cambridge Texts in the 
History of Political Thought, eds. John Hope Mason and Robert Walker. New York: 
Cambridge University Press, p. 20. 
2 I recognize the feminist critique of the public/private dichotomy in the human rights 
literature (see Romany 1993). I use the term “private” here to refer only to individuals, 
not the home or the family, or any other non-public social institution. 
3 See, for example, Pantin, Travis. 2008. “Hugo Chavez’s Jewish Problem.” Commentary, 
July/August 2008. 
4 James, Ian. 23 May 2009. Venezuela rejects concerns from UN, OAS on Media. 
Associated Press. 
 5 Márquez, Humberto. 1 December 2008. Venezuela: Reviving the Debate on 
Presidential Reelection. IPS, http://www.ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=44934. 
   6 Zachary, G Pascal. (24 April 2009). Zuma Rising: South Africa's new president is a 
man with the common touch – a rare populist among African leaders. The Guardian. 
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